Seminarios académicos y conferencias
Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type veri cation
22 agosto 2017 - 17:00 hrs.
Sala 209, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas UCVer investigación
Abstract: I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to
commit not to renegotiate. The agents type only a¤ects the principals utility.
The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agents type, which
can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agents report. I de ne renegotiation proof
mechanisms and characterize the optimal one: there is pooling on top – types
above a threshold report to be the largest type, while types below the threshold
report truthfully – and no regret on top – the mechanism is sequentially optimal
after the agent reports to be the largest type.