Cooperation Through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks
Constanza Fosco; Friederike Mengel.
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 35 (5), 641-658. 2011
We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in a Prisoners´ Dilemma. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields outcomes where both cooperators and defectors coexist under a wide range of parameters. Two scenarios can arise. Either there is “full separation” of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two different, disconnected components. Or there is “marginalization” of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. Our results are consistent with typical empirical findings on cooperation in networks
Ir a publicación
Etiquetas: aprendizaje, cooperación, redes, teoría de juegos