arrow checkmark code cross email facebook magnifier pdf phone plus twitter user youtube

Biblioteca

Publicado en: Artículo en revista académica

Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons

Rodrigo Harrison; Roger Lagunoff

International Economic Review, forthcoming

We model dynamic mechanisms for a global commons. Countries value both consumption and conservation of an open access resource. A country’s relative value of consumption-to-conservation is privately observed and evolves stochastically. An optimal quota maximizes world welfare subject to being implementable by Perfect Bayesian equilibria. With complete information, the optimal quota is first best; it allocates more of the resource each period to countries with high consumption value.

Under incomplete information, the optimal quota is fully compressed — identical countries always receive the same quota even as environmental costs and resource needs differ. This is true even when private information is negligible.

JEL Codes: C73, D82, F53, Q54, Q58

Key Words and Phrases: Optimal quota, full compression, fish wars, Perfect Bayesian equilibria, international agency, climate change

Ver Documento de Trabajo asociado

 

Descargar documento

Etiquetas: , , , , ,