Evolution of Impatience:The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game
Felipe Zurita; David K. Levine; Salvatore Modica; Federico Weinschelbaum.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2015 issue.
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.
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Etiquetas: teoría de juegos