arrow checkmark code cross email facebook magnifier pdf phone plus twitter user youtube


Publicado en: Artículo en revista académica

Intrahousehold Allocation and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Chile

Claudia Martínez A..

Economic Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 577-605. April 2013

Until 1999, children born out of wedlock in Chile had fewer child support rights than those born to married couples. I interpret a change in this law as an increase in the household bargaining power of women in cohabiting relationships. Using a panel of cross-sectional data, I find a decrease in the probability of working among men and an increase in school attendance of children under 19. These results provide evidence that contradicts the predictions of the unitary household model as well as the Nash bargaining model. The labor market outcomes support a model in which a reduction in men’s relative bargaining power is understood as a tax on their wages.


Ir a publicación
Etiquetas: , ,