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Publicado en: Artículo en revista académica

Self-selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance

Bernardita Vial; Claudio Sapelli.

Journal of Health Economics, 22(3): 459-476, 2003.

We study the existence of self-selection and moral hazard in the Chilean health insurance industry. Dependent workers must purchase health insurance either from one public or several private insurance providers. For them, we analyze the relationship between health care services utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. In the case of independent workers, where there is no mandate, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to voluntarily purchase health insurance. The results show self-selection against insurance companies for independent workers, and against public insurance for dependent workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization, but for medical visits, it is quantitatively important.


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