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Biblioteca

13 de abril 2015
Walrasian Equilibrium and Reputation Under Imperfect Public Monitoring

This paper examines a reputation-based mechanism that sustains the provision of high quality in the presence of competition among providers, where the incentive for high-quality production comes from a reputation premium: firms with higher reputations charge higher prices. The way we model the market highlights the fact that prices are not solely determined from consumers’ […]

04 de abril 2015
The Delegated Portfolio Management Problem: Reputation and Herding

This work studies the effects of the possibility of building a reputation in a delegated port-folio management context where financial intermediaries may herd. Reputation is modelled as investors´s Bayesian beliefs regarding the ability of intermediaries given their past per-formance. Unlike previous works, we characterize reputational equilibria in which inter- mediries´ decision to invest in reputation depends on […]

02 de abril 2015
Perfectly Competitive Education with Reputational Concerns

This dissertation analyzes how schools choose and signal their quality in the presence of asymmetric information. Student beliefs the quality offered by schools are updated in a Bayesian fashion according to test results. The present modeling of reputation departs from the existing literature to test results. The present modeling of reputation departs from the existing […]

31 de marzo 2015
Reputation-Driven Industry Dynamics

This paper studies the entry-exit dynamics of an experience good industry. Consumers observe noisy signals of past firm behavior and hold common beliefs regarding their types, or reputations. There is a small chance that ?rms may independently and unobservably be exogenously replaced. The market is perfectly competitive: entry is free, and all participants are price-takers. […]

24 de marzo 2015
Competitive Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring

In this paper we analyze a reputation-based mechanism that sustains the provision of high quality in a market for an experience good. In contrast to existing models of reputation, however, we consider a competitive market: there is a continuum of firms, each serving at most one consumer each period. We assume a perpetual probability of […]