

Nicolas Andres Figueroa Gonzalez

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Pontificia Universidad Católica
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PERSONAL DATA Full Name: Nicolas Andres Figueroa Gonzalez
Date of Birth: April 29, 1976
Place of Birth: Santiago, Chile
Nationality: Chilean
Actual Position: Associate Professor Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

RESEARCH INTERESTS Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Microeconomic Theory

STUDIES **University of Minnesota**, Minnesota, USA

Ph.D. in Economics July 2006.

- Thesis's subject: Two Essays in Mechanism Design
- Advisor: Marcel Richter.

Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile.

Ingeniero Civil Matemático, July 2000.

- Thesis's Subject: Some Stochastic Games with Complete and Incomplete Information
- Advisor: Roberto Cominetti.

Licenciatura en Ciencias de la Ingeniería, mención Matemática, 1999.

AWARDS AND GRANTS

Núcleo Milenio (as key researcher), Information and Coordination in Networks, years 2014-2017.

Núcleo Milenio (as young researcher), Information and Coordination in Networks, years 2011-2014.

Instituto Milenio (as young researcher), Complex Engineering Systems, years 2007-2011.

Fondecyt (as main researcher), Mechanism Design: Beyond Monotonicity, years 2014-2016.

Fondecyt (as main researcher), Procurement Mechanisms: Cost Reduction, Incentives to Investment and Barriers to Entry, years 2008-2010.

Fondecyt (as coinvestigator), An analysis of the procurement mechanism for public defenders: moral hazard and criminal supply, years 2007-2008.

Fondecyt (as coinvestigator), Incentives, Reputation and Teachers' Quality, years 2011-2012.

Dissertation Fellowship, Graduate School, University of Minnesota, years 2005-2006.

"Presidente de la Republica" Scholarship, MIDEPLAN, Chile, years 2000-2003.

Outstanding student award, Escuela de Ingeniería y Ciencias, Universidad de Chile, years 1996-1997 and 1999.

Academic Excellence Fellowship, Escuela de Ingeniería y Ciencias, Universidad de Chile, year 1994.

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile.

Main Professor

- Industrial Organization.
- Microeconomics II.
- Real Analysis.
- Microeconomic Theory III.

2011-present

Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile.

Main Professor

- Industrial Organization.
- Advanced Microeconomics for Masters.
- Auction Theory.
- Mechanism Design.
- Informational Asymmetries in Macroeconomic Models.
- Advanced Microeconomics.

2006-2011

University of Minnesota, Minnesota, USA.

Main Professor

- Game Theory, Fall 2004.
- Industrial Organization, Fall 2003 and Spring 2004
- Mathematical Economics, Spring 2003.
- Principles of Macroeconomics, Summer 2002-2004.

2002-2005

Teaching Assistant

- Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2000 and Spring 2001.
- Microeconomic Analysis, Fall 2001 and Spring 2002.
- Economic Integration of the Americas, Fall 2002.

2000-2002

MASTER'S
STUDENTS

Gonzalo Cisternas (Assistant Professor at MIT Sloan School of Business)
Jorge Lemus (Assistant Professor at Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
Jorge Catepillán (Ph.D. student at Northwestern)
Carlos Ramírez (Ph.D. student at Carnegie Mellon University (Finance))
Jorge Vásquez (Ph.D. student at Wisconsin)
Tibor Heumann (Ph.D. student at Yale)
Diego Vega (Ph.D. student at Olin Business School)
Nicolás Inostroza (Ph.D. student at Northwestern)
Alexis Orellana (Ph.D. student at Rochester)
Olivia Aravena (Ph.D. student at TSE)
Graciela Pérez (Ph.D. student at Stanford)
Andrea Canales (Ph.D. student at Universidad de Chile)
Jorge Mesías (Ph.D. student at Arizona State University)

PH.D. STUDENTS

Carla Guadalupi (graduated 2015), now professor at Universidad de las Islas Baleares).
Caroline Laplace (graduated 2016).

PUBLICATIONS

The Role of Optimal Threats in Auction Design (with Vasiliki Skreta). *Journal of Economic Theory* 144(2), March 2009, 884-897.

A Note on Optimal Auctions (with Vasiliki Skreta). *Economics Letters* 102(3), March 2009, 169-173.

On the Planner's Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design (with José Correa). *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, 5814 (2009), pp. 72-84. (Proceedings of SAGT 2009)

Optimal Allocation mechanisms with Single-dimensional Private Information (with Vasiliki Skreta). Review of Economic Design 15(3), 2011, 213-243.

Asymmetric Partnerships (with Vasiliki Skreta). Economics Letters 115(2), May 2012, 268-271.

Pricing with Markups in Industries with Increasing Marginal Costs(with José Correa, Roger Ledermann and Nicolás Stier-Moses). Mathematical Programming Ser.A 146, 2014,143-184.

Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions (with Gonzalo Cisternas). Rand Journal of Economics 46(4), 2015, 824-843.

Lending Standards and Their Impact on Productivity(with Oksana Leukhina). Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 59, 2015, 1-21.

Contracts as a Barrier to Entry (with Enrique Ide and Juan Pablo Montero). American Economic Review 106 (7), 2016, 1849-1877.

Regulation under Incomplete Information: Prices versus Quantities (with Leonardo Basso and Jorge Vásquez). Forthcoming Rand Journal of Economics.

WORKING PAPERS *What to Put on the Table.* (with Vasiliki Skreta). R&R, second round JPubET.

Liquidity and Credit Cycles(with Oksana Leukhina). R&R, Journal of Banking and Finance.

Patent Trading Flows of Small and Large Firms (with Carlos Serrano). Submitted.

Loyalty Inducing Programs and Competition with Homogeneous Goods (with Sebastián Infante and Ronald Fischer).

Mechanism design without the Single-Crossing Condition (with Tibor Heumann).

Contracts with Sabotage (with Joaquín Pobleto).

Interdisciplinary work

Adversarial Classification Using Signaling Games with An Application to Phishing Detection. (with Gastón L'huillier and Richard Weber). Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery 2016, 1-41.

MILP reformulations for the design of biotechnological multi-product batch plants using continuous equipment sizes and discrete host selection. (with Daniel Espinoza, Gabriela Sandoval and Juan Asenjo). Computers & Chemical Engineering 84, 2016, 1-11.

CONGRESS AND
CONFERENCE
PRESENTATIONS

Information Acquisition, Quality and Signalling through prices. Public Economic Theory Conference, Luxembourg City, Luxembourg July 2015.

Contracts as Barriers to Entry. North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Minneapolis. USA. June 2014.

Contracts as Barriers to Entry. European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Toulouse. France. July 2014.

Monopoly Pricing Under Incomplete Information: Prices v/s Quantities. Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Lima. Perú. November 2012.

Does the Market for Innovation Lead to a Division of Labor? Evidence From the Market for Patents. SECHI, Viña del Mar. Chile. September 2012

Auctions, Negotiations and Information Acquisition. 4th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Istanbul. July 2012

Procuring Legal Services Through Decentralized Contracting. Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Santiago. Chile. November 2011.

Auctions with an Ex-Post Negotiation. Workshop in Economic Theory of the Econometric Society. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. December 2010.

Auctions with an Ex-Post Negotiation. SECHI, Talca, Chile. September 2010.

Procuring Legal Services Through Decentralized Contracting. Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Buenos Aires. Argentina. October 2009.

On the Planners Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design. SAGT, Paphos, Cyprus. October 2009.

What to Put on the Table. SECHI, Antofagasta, Chile. September 2009.

Loyalty Inducing Programs and Competition with Homogeneous Goods. North American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Boston, MA. USA. July 2009.

On the Planner's loss due to Lack of Information. SECHI, Viña del Mar, Chile, September 2008.

Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions. GAMES, Evanston, IL. USA. July 2008.

Efficient Regulations for Wholesale Electricity Markets. SECHI, Viña del Mar, Chile, September 2007.

Bargaining over Multiple Issues. Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society. Ciudad de México, México, November 2006.

Bargaining over Multiple Issues. SECHI, La Serena, Chile, September 2006.

An Optimal Auction with Type-Dependent Externalities. Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society. Santiago, Chile, July 2004.

Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities. Clarence W. Tow Conference on Auctions. Iowa, May 2004.

REFEREEING
ACTIVITY

Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Journal, Journal of Banking and Finance, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Political Economic Theory, Review of Economic Design, Social Choice and Welfare, Operations Research, Management Science and Operations Management.