Seminarios académicos y conferencias
14 Junio 2016 - 17 hrs.
Sala 209, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas UC
This paper studies worker and firms’ investments in task-specific skills of different nature. Firm and workers underinvest in task-specific skills and also they distort their investment away from more productive tasks and in favor of tasks where intrinsic motivation is higher. Intrinsic motivation makes workers’ credit constraints more likely to bind and therefore worsen the misallocation of funds across skills. We also show that the interaction between different task-specific skills leads to multiplicity of equilibria with different turnover rates. Firm and workers are more willing to invest in workers’ skills in equilibria with low turnover rates and therefore we can use the multiplicity to explain the difference in investment behavior and the degree of multitasking between low turnover rate economies like Japan and high turnover rate economies like the US.