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Seminarios académicos y conferencias

Felipe González, Pontificia Universidad Católica

Distorted Quality Signals in School Markets

Coautores: José Ignacio Cuetsa, Cristian Larroulet.

3 Octubre 2017 - 15:30 hrs.

Sala 113, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas UC

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Abstract: Information plays a key role in markets with consumer choice. In education, data on
school quality is often gathered through standardized testing. However, the use of these
tests has been controversial because of behavioral responses that could distort performance
measures. We study the Chilean educational market and document that low-performing
students are underrepresented in test days, generating distortions in school quality information.
These distorted quality signals a↵ect parents’ school choice and induce misallocation
of public programs. These results indicate that undesirable responses to test-based
accountability systems may impose significant costs on educational markets.