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Seminarios académicos y conferencias

Jorge Lemos, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

17 Agosto 2022 - 15:30 horas

Contingent Prizes in Dynamic Contests∗

Presenta Jorge Lemos

Seminario Híbrido

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Abstract: Firms and government agencies are increasingly procuring solutions to problems using online contests, which typically provide public feedback on a real-time leaderboard and award all the prize pool at a preset deadline. Two economic forces shape the players’ incentives at any given time in the contest: a player’s chance to replace the current leader (“current competition”), and the competition during the rest of the contest (“future competition”). Current and future competition dynamically affect players’ incentives and may discourage effort. This motivates us to investigate, empirically.