Seminarios académicos y conferencias
"Belief elicitation when more than money matters"
Coautoreado con Giorgia Romagnoli y Jean-Pierre Benoit
3 Diciembre 2019 - 10:00 hrs.
Sala 108, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas UC
Abstract: Incentive compatible mechanisms for eliciting beliefs typically presume that money is the only argument in peopleís utility functions. However, subjects may also have non- monetary objectives that confound the mechanisms. In particular, psychologists have argued that people favour bets where their ability is involved over equivalent random bets ñ a so-called preference for control. We propose a new belief elicitation method that mitigates the control preference. With the help of this method, we determine that under the ostensibly incentive compatible matching probabilities method (Ducharme and Donnell (1973)), our subjects report beliefs 7% higher than their true beliefs in order to increase their control. Non-monetary objectives account for at least 27% of what would normally be measured as overconfidence. Our paper also contributes to a refined understanding of control. We find that control manifests itself only as a desire for betting on doing well; betting on doing badly is perceived as a negative.