Seminarios académicos y conferencias
"Strategic Information Overload"
Coautoreado con Jorge Lemus
1 Septiembre 2020 - 17:00 hrs.
Abstract: In this paper we consider a researcher with an idea, a referee and a grant sponsor. The idea can be good or bad, the researcher understands the idea only some times and the grant sponsor uses the referee’s report in order to decide if to finance the project or not. The researcher can strategically obfuscate the writing of his proposal, making more likely that the referee does not understand its actual value. We show that in equilibrium, better referees increase the level of obfuscation, and might make the grant sponsor worse-off. In an extension where researchers choose how much effort to put in searching for good ideas, we show that an increase in the availability of good ideas can end up in more obfuscation, a worse pool of ideas and a worse-off sponsor