Comportamientos Colusivos Según Grado de Complementariedad entre Bienes
Rosario Del Río D.
Tesis, Magíster en Economía, IE-PUC, 2015
Abstract: This paper analyzes how the degree of complementarity between two goods can affect the pricing and cartel stability decisions of two firms. With the aim of exemplifying scenarios of substitute and complementary goods, we rely on the space distribution of the gas stations on the Panamerican highway in Chile, and it can be shown that when the transport costs incurred by the consumer to arrive to a gas station are lower, the probability of seeing a collusive behavior in the end regions of the country will increase, and inversely if these costs are high. In order to detect these behaviors, a mechanism is developed to verify how firms pricing react to a positive shock in the marginal cost, and it is shown that if goods are substitutes, the colluding firms show a low reaction in relation to a competitive scenario. The opposite case is given for complementary goods, where prices of colluded firms react with greater magnitude than the firms that