Financiamiento interno y externo en un modelo de default soberano con gobierno y dos tipos de agentes
Samuel Leyton S.
Tesis, Magíster en Economía, IE-PUC, 2017
Abstract: In the present work, an extension is proposed for a sovereign default model that includes a government that exercises its fiscal policy with redistributive purposes in an explicit manner. The government can be financed externally (through debt) or internally (through taxes), where each of these is subject to a cost that is endogenous to the model. In this context, it is intended to study the behavior of optimal default decisions of a government that has different specifications for the way in which it prefers to redistribute resources among agents. Thus, from the numerical resolution of this relatively simple theoretical framework, it is concluded that the probability that a government decides to repudiate its debt will be much higher when the level of progressivity in the collection of
taxes is the highest and much lower when the government is restricted to delivering a majority share of total public spending to the low-income agent. Finally, the cyclical behavior of the trade balance and the interest rates is better suited to what one empirically would observed in a small open and emerging economy when it is assumed that public and private consumption are gross complements.