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Publicado en: Artículo en revista académica

Product Lines and Price Discrimination in Markets with Information Frictions

Juan-Pablo Montero; Natalia Fabra

Management Science, Vol. 68, N° 2, Páginas 981–1001

Abstract: A well-known principle in economics is that firms differentiate their product offerings in order to relax competition. However, in this paper we show that information frictions can invalidate this principle. We build a duopolistic competition model of second-degree price discrimination with information frictions in which (i) an equilibrium always exists with overlapping product qualities, whereas (ii) an equilibrium with non-overlapping product qualities exists only if information frictions and the costs of providing high quality are sufficiently small. As a consequence, reasons other than an attempt to soften competition should explain why firms in some cases carry non-overlapping product lines.