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The Scars of Exclusion: State Discrimination in Childhood and Ethnic Divisions in Africa

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Abstract

Does growing up while one's ethnic group is excluded from state power leave a lasting mark? Linking Afrobarometer respondents to their group's political history and comparing birth cohorts within the same group and survey, we find that exclusion in childhood strengthens ethnic over national identification and lowers trust in other ethnic groups, the army, and the police decades later. Later exclusion has weaker effects. The decline in trust toward other groups stems from active discrimination rather than powerlessness, and the effects do not reflect armed conflict. State exclusion hardens ethnic boundaries among those who grow up under it.

Keywords: Ethnic Discrimination, Political Exclusion, Ethnic Identity, Interethnic Trust, Childhood, Africa
JEL Classification: D74, J15, N47, O55, Z13

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1 Introduction

Ethnic divisions are a central obstacle to development in diverse societies. Where citizens identify with their ethnic group rather than with the nation, and distrust members of other groups, public goods are harder to provide, political competition turns ethnic, and conflict is more likely (Horowitz, 1985; Esteban and Ray, 2011; Ray and Esteban, 2017; Desmet et al., 2025). Overcoming these cleavages has therefore been a central challenge in the consolidation of modern states, from nineteenth-century Europe to present-day Africa, and governments have sought to forge a common national identity through mass schooling, military conscription, intergroup contact, and shared national experiences (Weber, 1976; Miguel, 2004; Alesina et al., 2020; Bandiera et al., 2019; Bazzi et al., 2019; Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020). Yet states do not only build nations; they can also deepen the very cleavages they need to overcome. Few state actions are as likely to shape these divisions as excluding entire ethnic groups from power, a widespread practice in postcolonial Africa. Indeed, every year since 1970, 25 to 34 African countries, about three in five of those in the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data (Vogt et al., 2015), have kept at least one politically relevant ethnic group out of executive power, leaving 79 to 99 groups powerless or actively discriminated against. Since 1980, between 165 and 267 million people have belonged to these groups (Figure A1). Exclusion from executive power is a well-documented predictor of rebellion and civil war (Wimmer et al., 2009; Cederman et al., 2010), thought to fuel conflict by generating collective grievances that strengthen attachment to the ethnic group, erode trust in the state and in other groups, and thereby ease mobilization along ethnic lines (Cederman et al., 2013). This mechanism, however, is typically inferred from the occurrence of conflict rather than observed directly. How exclusion shapes the way members of excluded groups see themselves and others, and whether these effects arise even where violence does not, remains far less understood.

In particular, we know little about how *lived* exclusion shapes ethnic divisions. Existing evidence relies on perceived discrimination: individuals who report that their group is treated unfairly identify more with their group and less with the nation (Tuki, 2026). Yet perception and identification are contemporaneous, subjective reports, and the direction of causality is unresolved. Moreover, a large literature shows that early-life experiences durably shape preferences and beliefs, and that exposure to intergroup threat in childhood strengthens in-group bias in a lasting way (Bauer et al., 2014; Rohner et al., 2013). These insights have not been applied to one of the most salient political experiences in African history: growing up while one's ethnic group is shut out of the state.

We aim to fill this gap. Specifically, we ask whether people whose ethnic group was

excluded from power identify more with their group, and trust other groups less, decades later. We pay particular attention to two dimensions of exposure. The first is *when* in life exclusion is experienced. Rather than imposing a single formative window, we let exposure in childhood (0–14), youth (15–25), early adulthood (26–35), and later adulthood (36+) enter jointly. The second is the *type* of exclusion. EPR distinguishes groups that the state actively and intentionally discriminates against from merely powerless groups, excluded from executive power without being targeted. These are very different experiences of the state, and they need not leave the same mark. Finally, we examine trust in the army and the police, the coercive arms of the state and the institutions through which members of an excluded group most directly encounter it, often as the instruments of discrimination. If growing up under exclusion teaches individuals that the state belongs to other groups, their distrust should extend to these institutions, but not to people in general or to their neighbors.

To explore these questions, we combine individual-level data from rounds 2–10 of the Afrobarometer (2002–2025) with the political status of every politically relevant ethnic group in Africa since 1946. We link each respondent to an EPR group through the ethnographic map of Murdock (1959) and the dialect-level conversion table of Guarnieri (2025). Our estimates compare people of the same ethnic group, interviewed in the same survey round, who were born in different years and were therefore exposed to their group's exclusion at different ages, so identification comes from groups whose status changed during our respondents' lives. Ethnic group$\times$round fixed effects absorb everything about the group at the time of the survey, including its current political status, and country$\times$birth-year fixed effects absorb every national shock that hit a birth cohort, such as independence, democratization, or schooling reforms. Since our outcomes are ordered survey responses, we estimate ordered probits, weighted by the Afrobarometer survey weights.

We find that exclusion experienced in childhood raises the probability that individuals identify only or more with their ethnic group rather than the nation by 1.2 percentage points, about 9% of the sample mean, and lowers the probability that they trust other ethnic groups "a lot" by 1.9 percentage points, about 11% of the mean. These effects are concentrated in childhood, with little or no effect of exclusion at later ages. The magnitudes are economically meaningful: the decline in trust toward other groups is comparable to the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in exposure to the slave trades estimated by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) for the same survey question, and the shift in identification equals the urban–rural gap in ethnic identification. Childhood exclusion also lowers trust in the army and the police, the coercive arms of the state that excluded the group. In contrast, trust in people in general, trust in neighbors, and attitudes toward democracy

are unaffected. Thus, childhood exclusion does not make people less trusting in general; it hardens the boundary between their group and others.

The type of exclusion matters. Ethnic identification rises with childhood exposure to both active discrimination and mere powerlessness. The decline in trust toward other groups, however, comes entirely from groups the state actively discriminated against (-3.5 percentage points), while powerless groups show a small and insignificant decline (-1.2). The decline in trust in the army and the police also comes mainly from discrimination.

Our design rests on the assumption that, absent exclusion, exposed cohorts would have evolved like unexposed cohorts of the same group. We probe this assumption in two ways. First, in a placebo test, we assign each cohort the exclusion its group experienced in the ten years before birth; this placebo exposure does not affect any outcome, so our estimates do not reflect a group's status before respondents were born. Second, younger cohorts in some groups may have become more attached to their group, and more distrustful of others, for reasons unrelated to exclusion. To address this, we allow each ethnic group its own birth-cohort trend. The identity results remain significant, though somewhat smaller. The decline in trust toward other groups is no longer significant with linear trends but is unchanged with quadratic ones, so we interpret it with more caution.

We also rule out three alternative explanations. The effects are not driven by conflict: they are the same whether or not exclusion coincided with armed conflict, and armed conflict without exclusion has no effect. Nor are they driven by material deprivation: childhood exclusion does not lower schooling, employment, or material well-being, or change urban residence, and controlling for schooling and urban residence leaves the estimates unchanged. Finally, they do not reflect greater perceived discrimination today: perceived unfair treatment responds to exclusion experienced in adulthood, not in childhood.

Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we add to the literature on political exclusion built around the EPR project, which has mainly studied exclusion as a driver of rebellion and civil conflict (Wimmer et al., 2009; Cederman et al., 2010; Buhaug et al., 2008; Alcorta et al., 2020). We ask instead what exclusion does to the identities and beliefs of those who grow up under it, and we show that the distinction between discrimination and powerlessness, central to that literature, also matters for these outcomes. Second, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of ethnic versus national identification in Africa (Robinson, 2014; Eifert et al., 2010; Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020). Whereas this literature has emphasized modernization, colonial legacies, electoral

competition, and shared national experiences such as the victories of national football teams, we show that a group's political history, as lived by its members in childhood, shapes identification decades later. Moreover, our results provide within-group evidence for the link between discrimination and ethnic identification based on perceived discrimination (Tuki, 2026). Our results also speak to the literature on nation building. Bazzi et al. (2019) show that contact between ethnic groups fosters national integration. We show that the state can also work in the opposite direction, deepening ethnic divisions through exclusion, and that the decline in trust toward other groups is concentrated among respondents living in ethnically homogeneous places, where contact with other groups is scarce. Third, we contribute to the literature on experience effects and the long-run consequences of early-life exposure (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2025; Bauer et al., 2014). Rather than a window in late adolescence, our results point to childhood as the stage at which political exclusion leaves its mark. Finally, we contribute to the literature on the historical roots of trust, division, and conflict in Africa (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Depetris-Chauvin and Özak, 2020), by showing that twentieth-century state exclusion shaped interethnic relations within a single lifetime.

2 Data and Empirical Strategy

2.1 Data

Afrobarometer. Individual-level data come from rounds 2–10 of the Afrobarometer surveys (2002–2025). Our two main outcomes are ethnic versus national identification and trust in other ethnic groups. Ethnic identification comes from the question "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [national] and being a [member of your ethnic group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?", asked in rounds 3–10, which we code on a three-point scale: identifies only or more with the nation (0; 43% of respondents), equally (1; 43%), or only or more with the ethnic group (2; 14%). Because the question asks respondents to weigh their attachment to the ethnic group against their attachment to the nation, it measures the strength of ethnic identity relative to national identity (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020), the margin at stake in nation building, rather than attachment to the group per se, which can coexist with a strong national identity. Trust in other ethnic groups ("How much do you trust [Kenyans] from other ethnic groups?") is asked in rounds 3, 9, and 10 on a four-point scale, from "not at all" to "a lot". We also use trust in people in general, in neighbors, in the army, and

in the police, as well as attitudes toward democracy, educational attainment, and urban residence.

Ethnic Power Relations. Group-level political status comes from the EPR Core 2021 dataset (Vogt et al., 2015), which codes, for every politically relevant ethnic group and year from 1946 onward, its access to executive power. We carry 2021 statuses forward to 2025. EPR distinguishes two forms of exclusion from executive power. DISCRIMINATED groups are subject to "active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state", with the intent of excluding them from political power. POWERLESS groups hold no representation in executive power, but are not explicitly discriminated against. We refer to groups with either status as *excluded*. Armed-conflict involvement of each group is taken from ACD2EPR (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012).

Linking respondents to EPR groups. We assign each respondent to an ethnic homeland group from Murdock (1959)'s ethnographic map, based on the ethnicity and language they report (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013), and link Murdock groups to EPR groups using the dialect-level conversion table of Guarnieri (2025), built with the LEDA package (Müller-Crepon et al., 2022). Respondents whose ethnicity label is not covered by the original assignments are assigned the Murdock group most common among earlier respondents with the same label or, failing that, the same home language. Respondents whose ethnicity maps to a neighboring country's homeland, or whose survey records only broad categories, are assigned directly to their EPR group after an audit against EPR's group lists. This happens when the reported ethnicity or language does not separate groups that EPR codes separately (e.g., Rundi speakers map to both Hutu and Tutsi). Because EPR re-codes groups when they split or merge, we follow each group's full lineage, and when a respondent's ethnicity maps to several contemporaneous EPR groups, exposure is the probability of exposure, weighting candidate groups by their EPR population shares.[1] Figure A2 maps the homelands of the 252 country–group pairs in our sample: members of 56 lived through a spell of discrimination, members of another 71 through powerlessness only, and the remaining 125 were never excluded while our respondents were alive.

Exposure and analysis sample. For each respondent, we infer the birth year from age and interview date and record, for each life stage $s \in \{0\text{–}14,\ 15\text{–}25,\ 26\text{–}35,\ 36+\}$, whether

[1] This affects 9% of respondents, from 13 ethnic groups; dropping them leaves the results unchanged (Section 3.5).

her group was excluded in at least one year while she was that age, up to the interview year. We also construct the same indicators separately for discrimination and for powerlessness without discrimination. We exclude respondents whose group is under an active discrimination spell at the time of the interview, so that the comparison is about past rather than current discrimination. The identification sample contains 197,746 respondents from 242 ethnic groups, 119 EPR groups, and 31 countries. Among them, 37% were exposed to exclusion in childhood (17% to discrimination and 20% to powerlessness only), and 45% at some point in their lives. Table B1 lists the 127 exposed ethnic groups and the EPR spells that define their exposure. Unlike in samples restricted to fewer survey rounds, the identifying variation is not concentrated in a single episode: no country accounts for more than 14% of the residual variation in childhood exposure.

2.2 Empirical Strategy

To explore the effect of exposure to exclusion at different stages of life, we estimate the following ordered probit model:

$$y^*_{igcbr} = \sum_s \beta_s \, \text{Excl}^s_{gb} + \theta \, \text{Female}_i + \alpha_{gr} + \delta_{cb} + \lambda_{a(i)} + \varepsilon_{igcbr}, \tag{1}$$

where y^*_{igcbr} is the latent outcome for respondent i of ethnic group g, born in country c in year b, and interviewed in round r, and the observed answer is the category whose cut points bracket y^*. Excl^s_{gb} indicates that group g was excluded while cohort b was in life stage s. α_{gr}, δ_{cb}, and λ_a denote ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects, respectively, where ethnic groups are country-specific. Fixed effects enter the likelihood as indicators, and cells whose answers do not vary are dropped.[2] All estimates are weighted by the Afrobarometer within-country survey weights, and we allow the error term to be correlated within EPR groups, the units whose political history defines treatment. We use this clustering for every standard error in the paper. Since the identifying variation comes from a limited number of exclusion episodes, we also report wild cluster bootstrap p-values for our main estimates, using the score bootstrap of Kline and Santos (2012), which perturbs the EPR-group contributions to the score with Rademacher weights (9,999 replications). We report average marginal effects on the probability of the top category: identifying only or more with the ethnic group, or trusting "a lot".

[2] Incidental-parameter bias should be small, since country×birth-year cells contain about 90 respondents on average. The estimator recovers known parameters in simulated data.

The fixed effects determine the comparison. Ethnic group×round effects absorb all differences between groups in a country, including whether a group was ever excluded and any selection into exclusion, as well as the group's situation at the time of the survey, such as its current status, its region, and how its members tend to answer. Country×birth-year effects absorb every shock that hit a birth cohort nationwide, such as independence, democratization, wars, and the expansion of schooling. Thus, the β_s are identified from groups whose status changed while cohorts of the same group were at different ages: a Luo born in 1960 was a child when the Kenyan state began to discriminate against the Luo in 1967, while a Luo born in 1940 was already an adult. Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on these fixed effects, exposed cohorts would have answered like unexposed cohorts of the same group.

3 Results

3.1 Childhood Exclusion and Ethnic Divisions

Figure 1 presents estimates of equation (1) for our two main outcomes (see Table A1). The left panel of the figure shows that exclusion experienced in childhood raises the probability of identifying only or more with one's ethnic group rather than the nation by 1.2 percentage points ($p < 0.01$; wild bootstrap $p < 0.001$). Exposure at ages 15–25 and 26–35 has no effect, while exposure at 36+ has a smaller and marginally significant effect (0.9 percentage points). Similarly, the right panel shows that childhood exclusion lowers the probability of trusting other ethnic groups "a lot" by 1.9 percentage points ($p < 0.01$; wild bootstrap $p < 0.001$), about 11% of the sample mean, while exclusion at later stages has no effect. The rightmost estimates in each panel come from a separate model that replaces the four life-stage indicators with a single indicator for whether the group was excluded at any point in the respondent's life. Individuals whose group was ever excluded are 1.1 percentage points more likely to identify ethnically and 2.9 percentage points less likely to trust other groups. This model compares cohorts who lived through their group's exclusion with those born after it ended. Over 80% of the former were exposed in childhood, and over 60% at several life stages, which may explain why the effect on trust is larger than the childhood effect.

How large are these effects? To compare them with the literature on the roots of trust in Africa, we use the same question and round (R3) as Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and re-estimate equation (1) by OLS. Childhood exclusion lowers trust in other ethnic groups by 0.07 standard deviations in our pooled sample, and by 0.10 in round 3, the round they




Figure 1: Exclusion across the life course, ethnic identification, and trust in other ethnic groups. Average marginal effects on the probability of identifying only or more with the ethnic group than with the nation (left) and of trusting other ethnic groups "a lot" (right). The four life stages are entered jointly; "ever excluded" is a separate model. Ordered probit, equation (1); within-country survey weights. Thin bars: 95% confidence intervals; thick bars: 90%; filled markers: $p < 0.05$. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level. Below each estimate: the average marginal effect (percentage points) and, in brackets, the wild cluster bootstrap p-value (score bootstrap, Rademacher weights at the EPR-group level, 9,999 replications). Above each panel: number of respondents, ethnic groups, EPR groups (clusters), and countries. Respondents whose group is under an active discrimination spell at the interview are excluded.

use. They find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the slave exports of one's ethnic group lowers this trust by 0.097 standard deviations. Thus, the decline in trust caused by childhood exclusion is comparable to that from a one-standard-deviation increase in exposure to the slave trades (74% and 108% of it, respectively). This comparison has limits: their estimates compare ethnic groups, ours compare cohorts within a group, and because our exposure is binary and affects about a third of respondents, our estimate is about a third of theirs in standardized-beta terms.

The effect on identification is also sizable. It equals the rural–urban gap in ethnic identification (1.2 percentage points) and about half the gap between respondents without and with secondary schooling (2.3 percentage points), two of the modernization factors emphasized by the literature on national identification in Africa (Robinson, 2014). The binary version of our estimate (2.2 percentage points) is similar to the effect of being surveyed one month closer to a competitive presidential election (1.8 percentage points; Eifert et al., 2010), but it persists for decades rather than weeks. Finally, our estimates can be compared with the short-run effects of a shared national experience. With the outcomes coded as in Depetris-Chauvin et al. (2020), childhood exclusion offsets 43 percent

of the effect of a national football team victory on ethnic identification and 28 percent of its effect on trust in other groups (Table A2). Unlike that effect, measured in the 15 days after a match, the effect of exclusion persists for decades.

These results suggest that exclusion experienced in childhood hardens ethnic boundaries. Individuals who grew up while their group was excluded from power identify more with their group and less with the nation, and trust members of other groups less.

3.2 Discrimination versus Powerlessness

Exclusion takes different forms. Some groups are actively targeted by the state, while others are simply left out of power. In Figure 2 we split each exposure into discrimination and powerlessness without discrimination, entering the eight indicators jointly. The left panel shows that ethnic identification rises with childhood exposure to both forms of exclusion (0.9 percentage points for discrimination and 1.4 for powerlessness). The right panel shows a sharp contrast for trust in other groups. Childhood exposure to discrimination lowers trust in other ethnic groups by 3.5 percentage points, while childhood exposure to powerlessness has a small and insignificant effect (-1.2 percentage points). The rightmost estimates, from a separate model with indicators for exposure to each type of exclusion at any age, show the same pattern: ever having lived under discrimination lowers trust in other groups by 3.4 percentage points (wild bootstrap $p = 0.028$), about twice the effect of powerlessness (-1.9; $p = 0.056$), while both raise ethnic identification by similar amounts (0.9 and 0.8 percentage points).

Thus, exclusion from power appears to be enough to make the ethnic group a more salient source of identity, but it takes targeted discrimination by the state to lower trust in other groups.

3.3 Distrust of Other Groups and the State, Not of Everyone

Exclusion could simply make people less trusting or more disaffected across the board. Table 1 shows that it does not, but that its effects extend from other groups to the state itself. Childhood exclusion lowers trust in the army (-1.3 percentage points) and the police (-1.1 percentage points), and exclusion at 36+ also lowers trust in the police (-1.4 percentage points). These are the coercive arms of the state, through which it enforces its rule, and its most visible face for members of excluded groups. As with trust in other groups (Section 3.2), these effects come mainly from discrimination: childhood discrimination lowers trust in the army and the police by 2.0 and 1.9 percentage points, while childhood powerlessness has smaller effects (-1.1 and -0.7). This is in line with the view




Figure 2: The type of exclusion: discrimination versus powerlessness. Average marginal effects of exposure to discrimination (circles) and to powerlessness without discrimination (squares) at each life stage, all eight entered jointly; "Ever": indicators for exposure to discrimination and to powerlessness without discrimination at any age, entered jointly in a separate model (a respondent may have been exposed to both). Ordered probit, equation (1); within-country survey weights. Thin bars: 95% confidence intervals; thick bars: 90%; filled markers: $p < 0.05$. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level.

that discrimination teaches individuals that the state belongs to other groups, so that distrust of those groups extends to the institutions seen as acting on their behalf.

In contrast, exclusion at any stage of life has no effect on trust in people in general or on trust in neighbors (childhood: 0.3 and -0.2 percentage points), and no effect on support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, or the assessment of whether the country is a democracy. The split by type of exclusion is more mixed for these outcomes: childhood discrimination lowers trust in neighbors (-1.9 percentage points) but raises generalized trust (3.6) and satisfaction with democracy (1.6), while childhood powerlessness affects none of them. Since these estimates differ in sign and are significant only at the 5 percent level, we do not interpret them further. Thus, the effects we document are concentrated at the ethnic boundary and in the state that enforced it: excluded cohorts are not less trusting or more disaffected in general, but more distant from other groups and from the state's coercive institutions.

3.4 Identification

Exclusion spells may coincide with other shocks that marked particular cohorts of particular groups. Panel A of Table 2 probes the two main threats to our identifying assumption. First, one may worry that the childhood effect captures the status of the group before the

Table 1: Childhood exclusion, trust in the state, and other attitudes

	Excluded at ages (jointly)				Ever	At 0–14			
Outcome	0–14	15–25	26–35	36+	excluded	Discr.	Powerl.	Mean	*N*
A. The state's coercive institutions									
Trust in the army	-1.3^{**}	0.2	-0.5	-1.2	-0.9	-2.0^{**}	-1.1^{*}	0.40	200,787
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.6)		
Trust in the police	-1.1^{**}	0.4	-0.5	-1.4^{**}	-0.6	-1.9^{***}	-0.7	0.25	221,698
	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.5)		
B. People in general									
Generalized trust	0.3	0.5	-0.1	-1.1	0.7	3.6^{**}	-0.8	0.17	71,683
	(0.9)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.8)	(0.9)		
Trust in neighbors	-0.2	1.1^{*}	0.3	-0.3	-1.5^{*}	-1.9^{**}	0.7	0.28	103,319
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.7)		
C. Democracy									
Democracy preferable	-0.6	0.3	0.3	-0.9	-0.0	-1.6	-0.2	0.73	211,921
	(0.7)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(1.1)	(1.2)	(0.8)		
Satisfied with democracy	0.2	0.3	0.8	-1.2	-0.2	1.6^{**}	-0.1	0.48	211,555
	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(1.3)	(0.7)	(0.8)		
Country is a democracy	0.6	0.5	0.0	-0.5	-0.1	-0.3	1.3^{*}	0.56	208,606
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(0.7)		

Notes: Average marginal effects (percentage points) on the probability of the top category (trusting "a lot"; most people can be trusted; democracy is preferable; fairly or very satisfied; full democracy or with minor problems), from ordered probit (probit for binary outcomes) estimates of equation (1). The four life stages are entered jointly; "ever excluded" is a separate model. "Discr." and "Powerl.": exposure at ages 0–14 to discrimination and to powerlessness without discrimination, from a separate model with the eight type-specific life-stage indicators entered jointly. Mean: share of respondents in the top category. Rounds: generalized trust R3, R5, R8; neighbors R3, R5, R9, R10; army and police R2–R10; democracy R2–R10. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

respondent was born, which may affect her family's circumstances. Reassuringly, "exposure" to exclusion in the ten years before birth does not affect any outcome (0.2 percentage points for identification and 0.9 for trust in other groups), and the childhood effects are unchanged when we control for it. Second, groups may have followed different secular trajectories in identification and trust. When we allow each ethnic group its own linear birth-cohort trend, the effect on identification remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level, though somewhat smaller (0.9 percentage points), while the effect on trust in other groups falls to -0.8 percentage points and is no longer statistically significant (wild bootstrap $p = 0.203$). With quadratic group-specific cohort trends, in contrast, the effect on trust in other groups is -2.0 percentage points (wild bootstrap $p = 0.008$) and the effect on identification is 0.9 ($p = 0.002$). Since childhood exposure is itself a function of birth cohort within a group, cohort trends can absorb part of the effect, and the sensitivity of the trust result depends on the functional form of the trend. We therefore regard the

Table 2: Childhood exclusion: identification checks and alternative explanations

	Ethnic over national identity (1)	Trust in other ethnic groups (2)	Trust in the army (3)	Trust in the police (4)
Effect of exclusion at ages 0–14				
Baseline	1.2^{***}	-1.9^{***}	-1.3^{**}	-1.1^{**}
	(0.2)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.020]	[0.010]
A. Identification				
Control: exclusion before birth	1.2^{***}	-1.9^{***}	-1.3^{**}	-1.1^{**}
	(0.2)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.019]	[0.012]
Coefficient on exclusion before birth	0.2	0.9	0.5	0.5
	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)
Group-specific birth-cohort trend:				
Linear	0.9^{***}	-0.8	-1.1^{*}	-1.6^{**}
	(0.3)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)
	[0.000]	[0.203]	[0.067]	[0.007]
Quadratic	0.9^{***}	-2.0^{**}	-0.9	-1.3^{**}
	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.6)
	[0.002]	[0.008]	[0.113]	[0.026]
B. Alternative explanations				
Control: armed conflict	1.3^{***}	-1.8^{***}	-1.2^{**}	-0.9^{**}
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.5)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.036]	[0.039]
Control: schooling and urban residence	1.2^{***}	-1.8^{***}	-1.3^{**}	-1.1^{**}
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.5)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.018]	[0.012]

Notes: Each cell reports the average marginal effect (percentage points) of exclusion at ages 0–14 on the probability of the top category from a separate ordered probit estimate of equation (1), with the four life stages entered jointly and the additional controls indicated in each row. Panel A addresses the identifying assumption: group-specific linear or quadratic birth-cohort trends, and an indicator that the group was excluded in the ten years before the respondent's birth (whose coefficient is reported in the row below). Panel B adds controls for alternative explanations: the group's involvement in armed conflict at ages 0–14 and later, and the respondent's secondary schooling and urban residence. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses, and wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (score bootstrap, Rademacher weights at the EPR-group level, 9,999 replications); *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

identification result as our most robust finding and the trust result as more tentative. The effects on trust in the army and the police also survive group-specific linear cohort trends.

3.5 Robustness

Our results are robust to several other choices. First, they do not depend on the definition of childhood: the results are similar with childhood defined as ages 0–18 (Table A3). Second, they do not depend on the 9% of respondents whose ethnicity maps to several EPR groups with different statuses (Table A4). Third, exclusion episodes are country-specific, so one may worry that a single country drives our results. Figure A3 re-estimates the childhood effect dropping one country at a time. The effect on identification ranges between 1.1 and 1.4 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all 31 samples. The effect on trust in other ethnic groups ranges between -2.2 and -1.4 percentage points and is significant at the 5 percent level in all 28 samples. The effects on trust in the army and the police remain negative in every sample. Likewise, no single group drives the results: dropping one ethnic group at a time, the childhood effect ranges between 1.1 and 1.4 percentage points for identification and between -2.2 and -1.5 percentage points for trust in other ethnic groups (Figure A4). Nor do a few salient episodes drive them: 58% of the residual variation in childhood exposure comes from spells that began after independence, no lineage holds more than 6% of it, and when we drop one lineage at a time the childhood effects remain very similar in magnitude (Table A9). Fourth, across all the estimates in Tables A1 and 2, wild cluster bootstrap p-values are very close to those based on clustered standard errors, so our inference does not rest on the asymptotic approximation. Finally, Tables A5 and A6 re-estimate Tables A1 and 2 by OLS, as linear probability models with each outcome coded one for its top category and zero otherwise. The identification results are, if anything, stronger: childhood exclusion raises the probability of identifying more with the ethnic group than with the nation by 2.3 percentage points (wild bootstrap $p < 0.001$), and the effect survives linear and quadratic group-specific cohort trends (2.4 and 2.5 percentage points). Childhood exclusion lowers trust in other ethnic groups by 1.8 percentage points ($p = 0.050$), driven by discrimination. The effects on trust in the army and the police are imprecise in the linear model, which suggests that exclusion shifts trust in these institutions across the whole scale rather than only in its top category. OLS on the original scales confirms this (Tables A7 and A8). Childhood exclusion raises the 0–2 identification scale by 0.035 points (wild bootstrap $p < 0.001$) and lowers the 0–3 trust scales by -0.070 points for other ethnic groups ($p = 0.002$), -0.040 for the army ($p = 0.008$), and -0.038 for the police ($p = 0.013$). These estimates are unchanged by the controls and the placebo of Table 2, and they respond to cohort trends as the ordered probit estimates do.

3.6 Alternative Explanations

We consider three alternative explanations, each of which would imply a different reading of our results: growing up amid armed conflict, material deprivation, and present-day grievances.

Armed conflict. Exclusion is often accompanied by violence, so the childhood effect may reflect growing up amid armed conflict rather than exclusion itself. Controlling for the group's involvement in armed conflict at ages 0–14 and later leaves the estimates unchanged (1.3 and -1.8 percentage points; Table 2, Panel B). Figure 3 goes further and runs a horse race. At each life stage, we split exposure into three mutually exclusive indicators, entered jointly: the group was excluded in a year in which it was also involved in armed conflict (ACD2EPR); it was excluded but never while in conflict; or it was in conflict without being excluded. Childhood exclusion raises ethnic identification by the same amount with and without conflict (1.3 and 1.3 percentage points; wild bootstrap $p = 0.009$ and $p < 0.001$), and lowers trust in other groups in both cases (-2.3 and -1.4 percentage points; $p = 0.035$ and $p = 0.025$). In contrast, armed conflict in childhood without exclusion has no effect on either outcome (0.0 and 1.2 percentage points). Thus, it is exclusion by the state, not exposure to violence, that hardens ethnic boundaries.

Material deprivation. Discriminatory states also restricted access to schooling, public employment, and public goods (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Burgess et al., 2015), and education and urbanization are themselves associated with weaker ethnic identification. Yet childhood exclusion does not reduce schooling, employment, or economic well-being (Table A10), nor does it change urban residence (-0.1 percentage points). It does not lower the probability of completing primary or secondary school, and slightly raises that of post-secondary education (1.9 percentage points); it does not lower employment (0.6 percentage points) and, if anything, lowers unemployment (-2.1); and it has no effect on self-assessed living conditions, absolute or relative to others, on the Lived Poverty Index, or on going without food, water, medical care, cooking fuel, or cash income. Moreover, controlling for schooling and urban residence leaves the estimates unchanged (1.2 and -1.8 percentage points; Table 2, Panel B), so a material channel is unlikely to account for our results.

Present-day grievance. Finally, the effects do not reflect greater perceived discrimination today. Childhood exclusion has no effect on the probability of reporting that one's ethnic group is often or always treated unfairly by the government (-0.2 percentage




Figure 3: Exclusion with and without armed conflict, and armed conflict without exclusion. Average marginal effects on the probability of identifying only or more with the ethnic group than with the nation (left) and of trusting other ethnic groups "a lot" (right). At each life stage, exposure is split into three mutually exclusive indicators: the group was excluded in a year in which it was involved in armed conflict (circles); excluded, but never while in armed conflict (squares); involved in armed conflict without being excluded (diamonds). All twelve indicators are entered jointly. Armed conflict: group involvement in ACD2EPR. Ordered probit, equation (1); within-country survey weights. Thin bars: 95% confidence intervals; thick bars: 90%; filled markers: $p < 0.05$. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level. Exposed shares at ages 0–14 (identification sample): 10% excluded with conflict, 27% excluded without conflict, 2% conflict without exclusion (about 50 ethnic groups).

points, $p = 0.74$; Table A10). Perceived unfair treatment instead responds to exclusion experienced in adulthood: exposure at ages 36+ raises it by 1.4 percentage points, and by 3.5 percentage points when the group was actively discriminated against. Thus, perceived discrimination tracks the group's recent experience of the state, whereas the effects of childhood exclusion on identification and trust persist without a corresponding grievance. This pattern also suggests that the association between perceived discrimination and ethnic identification (Tuki, 2026) and the effect of lived exclusion we document capture different phenomena.

3.7 Who Is Most Affected, and Why

Individual characteristics. The effects of exclusion are similar for women and men, for respondents with and without secondary schooling, and in rural and urban areas: none of the interactions between ever having been excluded and these characteristics is statistically significant (wild bootstrap $p \geq 0.22$ for identification and $p \geq 0.48$ for trust in other groups; Table A11, Panel A).

Local ethnic diversity. The decline in trust toward other groups differs with the ethnic diversity of the place where respondents live. We measure the ethnic fractionalization of the respondent's region, and of her district in the rounds that record it (R5–R7, R9, R10), using all Afrobarometer respondents in each round, and split the sample at the median. Among respondents living in ethnically homogeneous regions, childhood exclusion lowers trust in other ethnic groups by 2.3 percentage points, whereas among those living in diverse regions it has no effect (0.1). The district measure shows the same pattern (-2.2 versus -0.8; Figures A5 and A6), and the interaction between ever having been excluded and fractionalization is statistically significant at both levels (wild bootstrap $p = 0.035$ for regions and $p = 0.018$ for districts; Table A12). There is no clear pattern for ethnic identification. What appears to matter is living among members of other groups that were also excluded. We compute the share of linked respondents in the same district and round whose group was ever excluded, and split it into neighbors from the respondent's own EPR group and from other groups. The decline in trust toward other groups is smaller where a larger share of neighbors belong to other excluded groups (wild bootstrap $p = 0.001$), also when we control for the share of co-ethnic neighbors ($p = 0.002$), whereas the share of excluded co-ethnic neighbors makes no difference ($p = 0.92$; Table A12, Panel A). This pattern is consistent with evidence that intergroup contact fosters national integration (Bazzi et al., 2019) and that isolation from other groups sharpens group-based political behavior (de Kadt and Sands, 2021): where contact with other groups is scarce, beliefs about them formed under exclusion may be less likely to be corrected. However, fractionalization and the composition of one's neighbors are not randomly assigned and are measured where respondents live at the time of the survey, which may itself respond to exclusion, so we view this pattern as suggestive.

Interpretation. A large literature emphasizes late adolescence and early adulthood as the period in which political attitudes crystallize (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Acemoglu et al., 2025). Our results instead point to childhood. One interpretation is that ethnic identity and beliefs about other groups are formed early, through the family and the community, and that a group's exclusion from the state shapes the narratives about "us" and "them" that children grow up with, consistent with evidence that exposure to intergroup threat in childhood durably strengthens in-group bias (Bauer et al., 2014). This reading is consistent with the absence of effects of exclusion before birth, of material losses, and of present-day grievances. Exclusion from power appears to be enough to make the ethnic group a more salient source of identity, consistent with evidence that the political arena shapes which cultural differences become salient (Posner, 2004). Discrimination, unlike

powerlessness, may be experienced as the action of a state controlled by other groups, and so update beliefs about those groups and about the institutions that enforce the state's authority (Glaeser, 2005). Where contact with other groups is scarce, these beliefs may be less likely to be corrected.

4 Concluding Remarks

Individuals whose ethnic group was excluded from power while they were children identify more with their group and less with the nation, and trust other ethnic groups, the army, and the police less, decades later. Exclusion experienced later in life has much weaker effects, and exclusion leaves trust in people in general, trust in neighbors, and support for democracy unchanged. The type of exclusion matters: any exclusion strengthens ethnic identification, but the decline in trust toward other groups comes from groups the state actively discriminated against.

These results have implications for our understanding of ethnic divisions in Africa. A large literature has studied the costs of political exclusion in terms of rebellion and conflict. Our findings suggest an additional and less visible cost: by shaping the identities and beliefs of children, state-led exclusion hardens ethnic boundaries for decades, well after the exclusion itself has ended. Two caveats qualify this conclusion. Our estimates draw on a limited number of historical episodes of exclusion, so they describe an average over these experiences. And while our design absorbs all permanent and time-varying group differences at the time of the survey, as well as every national cohort shock, it cannot rule out every shock that coincided with exclusion and hit the same cohorts of the same groups.

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Online Appendix (Not for Publication)

The Scars of Exclusion: State Discrimination in Childhood and Ethnic Divisions in Africa

A Additional Results

A.1 Data




Figure A1: The prevalence of ethnic exclusion in Africa, 1946–2021. Left axis: number of EPR groups that were discriminated against or powerless (excluded from executive power without being targeted), number of countries with at least one excluded group, and number of countries covered by EPR. Right axis (shaded area): millions of people in discriminated or powerless groups, computed as each group's EPR population share times the country's population from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (available from 1960; World Bank, 2026). All African countries in EPR-Core 2021 (Vogt et al., 2015). Groups are counted by EPR group code in each year, so splits and mergers can produce small jumps.




Figure A2: Ethnic homelands in the sample, by the exclusion their members lived through. Each polygon is the part of a Murdock (1959) homeland within a sample country, colored by the most severe EPR status of the linked group (and its lineage) during the lifetimes of sampled respondents: discriminated at some point; powerless but never discriminated; never excluded. Groups assigned directly to EPR groups after the audit are mapped to the homelands that the conversion table links to those EPR groups in that country. Country borders: Natural Earth (1:50m). Sample: respondents with at least one of the main outcomes.

A.2 Main Results

Table A1: Exclusion across the life course, ethnic identification, and trust in other ethnic groups

	Ethnic over national identity		Trust in other ethnic groups	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Excluded at ages 0–14	1.2***		−1.9***	
	(0.2)		(0.6)	
	[0.000]		[0.000]	
Excluded at ages 15–25	−0.2		0.5	
	(0.3)		(0.5)	
	[0.533]		[0.308]	
Excluded at ages 26–35	0.2		−0.4	
	(0.3)		(0.8)	
	[0.614]		[0.652]	
Excluded at ages 36+	0.9*		−0.4	
	(0.5)		(0.7)	
	[0.059]		[0.582]	
Ever excluded		1.1***		−2.9***
		(0.3)		(1.1)
		[0.000]		[0.003]
Share of top category	0.137		0.176	
Observations	196,539	196,539	72,009	72,009
Ethnic groups / EPR clusters	242 / 119		223 / 115	
Countries; rounds	31; R3–R10		28; R3, R9, R10	

Notes: Average marginal effects (percentage points) on the probability of identifying only or more with the ethnic group than with the nation (columns 1–2) and of trusting other ethnic groups "a lot" (columns 3–4), from ordered probit estimates of equation (1): ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects; female indicator; within-country survey weights. In columns 1 and 3 the four life stages are entered jointly. Respondents whose group is under an active discrimination spell at the interview are excluded. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses, and wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (score bootstrap, Rademacher weights at the EPR-group level, 9,999 replications); *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, based on the clustered standard errors.

Table A2: Outcomes coded as in Depetris-Chauvin et al. (2020)

	Ethnic over national identity (only or more ethnic)		Trusts other ethnic groups (somewhat or a lot)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. Probit (average marginal effects)				
Excluded at ages 0–14	2.2***		−3.8***	
	(0.4)		(0.9)	
Excluded at ages 15–25	0.3		−0.0	
	(0.5)		(1.0)	
Excluded at ages 26–35	0.3		−1.1	
	(0.4)		(1.3)	
Excluded at ages 36+	1.5**		−0.6	
	(0.6)		(1.1)	
Ever excluded		2.3***		−5.9***
		(0.6)		(1.5)
Observations	193,163	193,163	71,656	71,656
Panel B. Linear probability model				
Excluded at ages 0–14	2.3***		−3.9***	
	(0.3)		(1.0)	
Excluded at ages 15–25	0.3		−0.1	
	(0.6)		(1.1)	
Excluded at ages 26–35	0.4		−1.3	
	(0.4)		(1.4)	
Excluded at ages 36+	1.5**		−0.4	
	(0.6)		(1.1)	
Ever excluded		2.7***		−6.2***
		(0.5)		(1.5)
Observations	197,581	197,581	72,110	72,110
Mean of outcome	0.137		0.500	
Ethnic groups / EPR clusters	242 / 119		223 / 115	
Countries; rounds	31; R3–R10		28; R3, R9, R10	

Notes: Estimates of equation (1) with the binary outcomes of Depetris-Chauvin et al. (2020): identifying only or more with the ethnic group than with the nation (columns 1–2) and trusting people from other ethnic groups "somewhat" or "a lot" (columns 3–4). Panel A: average marginal effects (percentage points) from probit estimates; Panel B: linear probability model coefficients multiplied by 100 (the estimator used in that paper). The four life stages are entered jointly in columns 1 and 3; columns 2 and 4 use an indicator for exclusion at any age. Ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects; female indicator; within-country survey weights. Respondents whose group is under an active discrimination spell at the interview are excluded. Observations differ across panels because the probit drops fixed-effect cells without variation in the outcome. Mean of outcome: weighted mean. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.3 Robustness

Table A3: Defining childhood as ages 0–18

Outcome	0–18	19–25	26–35	36+	*N*
Ethnic over national identity	1.3***	−0.5	0.2	0.8*	196,539
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	
Other ethnic groups	−1.6**	0.8	−0.4	−0.3	72,009
	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.7)	
Army	−1.7***	−0.0	−0.6	−1.3*	200,787
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.8)	
Police	−1.1**	0.8*	−0.6	−1.3**	221,698
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.6)	
Neighbors	−0.2	0.8	0.3	−0.5	103,319
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.8)	
Generalized trust	0.3	1.1*	−0.3	−1.0	71,683
	(0.9)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.9)	

Notes: Average marginal effects (percentage points) on the probability of the top category from ordered probit (probit for generalized trust) estimates of equation (1) with life stages 0–18, 19–25, 26–35, and 36+ entered jointly. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A4: Dropping respondents mapped to several EPR groups

	Ethnic over national identity (1)	Trust in other ethnic groups (2)	Trust in the army (3)	Trust in the police (4)
A. Life stages (entered jointly)				
Excluded at ages 0–14	1.3***	−1.3**	−1.1*	−1.1**
	(0.3)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)
	[0.000]	[0.024]	[0.090]	[0.017]
Excluded at ages 15–25	0.0	0.7	0.3	0.2
	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.5)
Excluded at ages 26–35	0.1	−0.2	−0.4	−0.5
	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.5)
Excluded at ages 36+	1.0**	−0.4	−1.2	−1.4**
	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.6)
B. Separate model				
Ever excluded	1.0***	−2.3*	−0.5	−0.7
	(0.3)	(1.2)	(0.9)	(0.8)
	[0.002]	[0.045]	[0.572]	[0.362]
Observations	178,206	65,576	181,417	200,248
Share of respondents dropped	9.3%	8.9%	9.6%	9.7%

Notes: Ordered probit estimates of equation (1), as in Figure 1 and Table 2, excluding respondents whose ethnicity maps to several contemporaneous EPR groups with different statuses, so that their exposure is a probability rather than zero or one (Section 2.1). Panel A: the four life stages entered jointly; Panel B: an indicator for exclusion at any age, in a separate model. Average marginal effects (percentage points) on the probability of the top category. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses, and wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (score bootstrap, Rademacher weights at the EPR-group level, 9,999 replications); *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A5: Linear probability model: exclusion across the life course (Table A1)

	Ethnic over national identity		Trust in other ethnic groups	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Excluded at ages 0–14	2.3***		−1.8*	
	(0.3)		(0.9)	
	[0.000]		[0.050]	
Excluded at ages 15–25	0.3		0.9	
	(0.6)		(0.8)	
Excluded at ages 26–35	0.4		0.7	
	(0.4)		(1.0)	
Excluded at ages 36+	1.5**		0.3	
	(0.6)		(1.2)	
Ever excluded		2.7***		−2.5
		(0.5)		(1.6)
		[0.000]		[0.141]
Mean of outcome	0.137		0.176	
Observations	197,581	197,581	72,110	72,110

Notes: Linear probability model estimates of equation (1) with the four life stages entered jointly (columns 1 and 3) or an indicator for exclusion at any age (columns 2 and 4), with each outcome equal to one for its top category (identifying only or more with the ethnic group than with the nation; trusting "a lot") and zero otherwise. Coefficients multiplied by 100 (percentage points). Ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects; female indicator; within-country survey weights. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses; for the childhood and ever-excluded estimates, wild cluster restricted bootstrap p-values in brackets (Rademacher weights at the EPR-group level, 9,999 replications); *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A6: Linear probability model: identification checks and alternative explanations (Table 2)

	Ethnic over national identity (1)	Trust in other ethnic groups (2)	Trust in the army (3)	Trust in the police (4)
Effect of exclusion at ages 0–14				
Baseline	2.3***	−1.8*	−0.7	−0.8
	(0.3)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.6)
	[0.000]	[0.050]	[0.293]	[0.197]
A. Identification				
Control: exclusion before birth	2.3***	−1.8*	−0.7	−0.8
	(0.3)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.6)
	[0.000]	[0.047]	[0.295]	[0.197]
Coefficient on exclusion before birth	0.3	−0.1	−0.2	0.1
	(0.5)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.6)
	[0.547]	[0.927]	[0.865]	[0.868]
Group-specific birth-cohort trend:				
Linear	2.4***	−0.8	−0.8	−1.3*
	(0.4)	(1.0)	(0.8)	(0.7)
	[0.000]	[0.379]	[0.311]	[0.090]
Quadratic	2.5***	−1.4	−0.5	−0.8
	(0.5)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(0.8)
	[0.000]	[0.210]	[0.585]	[0.303]
B. Alternative explanations				
Control: armed conflict	2.2***	−1.8*	−0.7	−0.6
	(0.3)	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.6)
	[0.000]	[0.055]	[0.341]	[0.345]
Control: schooling and urban residence	2.3***	−1.6*	−0.7	−0.8
	(0.3)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.6)
	[0.000]	[0.072]	[0.314]	[0.224]
C. Type of exclusion (entered jointly, all ages)				
Discriminated at 0–14	1.7***	−4.8***	−1.4*	−1.5
	(0.7)	(1.6)	(0.8)	(0.9)
	[0.020]	[0.005]	[0.099]	[0.128]
Powerless at 0–14	2.4***	−0.5	−0.5	−0.3
	(0.5)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.7)
	[0.000]	[0.578]	[0.546]	[0.665]
Mean of outcome	0.137	0.176	0.397	0.250
Observations	197,581	72,110	200,953	221,777

Notes: Linear probability model estimates of equation (1) with the four life stages entered jointly and the additional controls indicated in each row; Panels A and B as in Table 2, and Panel C splits exposure at every stage into discrimination and powerlessness without discrimination, entered jointly. Each outcome is equal to one for its top category (identifying only or more with the ethnic group than with the nation; trusting "a lot") and zero otherwise. Coefficients multiplied by 100 (percentage points). Ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects; female indicator; within-country survey weights. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses; wild cluster restricted bootstrap p-values in brackets (Rademacher weights at the EPR-group level, 9,999 replications); *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A7: OLS on the original scales: exclusion across the life course (Table A1)

	Ethnic over national identity (0–2)		Trust in other ethnic groups (0–3)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Excluded at ages 0–14	0.035***		−0.070***	
	(0.006)		(0.021)	
	[0.000]		[0.002]	
Excluded at ages 15–25	−0.006		0.016	
	(0.009)		(0.018)	
Excluded at ages 26–35	0.005		−0.015	
	(0.009)		(0.029)	
Excluded at ages 36+	0.024*		−0.012	
	(0.012)		(0.024)	
Ever excluded		0.032***		−0.108***
		(0.009)		(0.039)
		[0.001]		[0.015]
Mean of outcome		0.709		1.498
Observations	197,581	197,581	72,110	72,110

Notes: OLS estimates of equation (1) with the four life stages entered jointly (columns 1 and 3) or an indicator for exclusion at any age (columns 2 and 4). Outcomes on their original scales: ethnic over national identity from 0 (only or more national) to 2 (only or more ethnic); trust in other ethnic groups from 0 (not at all) to 3 (a lot). Coefficients in scale points. Ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects; female indicator; within-country survey weights. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses; for the childhood and ever-excluded estimates, wild cluster restricted bootstrap p-values in brackets (Rademacher weights at the EPR-group level, 9,999 replications); *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A8: OLS on the original scales: identification checks and alternative explanations (Table 2)

	Ethnic over national identity (0–2)	Trust in other ethnic groups (0–3)	Trust in the army (0–3)	Trust in the police (0–3)
Effect of exclusion at ages 0–14				
Baseline	0.035***	−0.070***	−0.040**	−0.038**
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)
	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.008]	[0.013]
A. Identification				
Control: exclusion before birth	0.035***	−0.071***	−0.040***	−0.038**
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.008]	[0.013]
Coefficient on exclusion before birth	0.005	0.032	0.012	0.010
	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.017)
	[0.594]	[0.210]	[0.521]	[0.564]
Group-specific birth-cohort trend:				
Linear	0.026***	−0.034	−0.032*	−0.049**
	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.019)
	[0.000]	[0.148]	[0.055]	[0.011]
Quadratic	0.027***	−0.074**	−0.027*	−0.038**
	(0.009)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.019)
	[0.005]	[0.020]	[0.094]	[0.038]
B. Alternative explanations				
Control: armed conflict	0.035***	−0.069***	−0.036**	−0.032**
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.015)
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.024]	[0.041]
Control: schooling and urban residence	0.035***	−0.067***	−0.040**	−0.038**
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)
	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.014]
C. Type of exclusion (entered jointly, all ages)				
Discriminated at 0–14	0.026**	−0.128***	−0.056**	−0.059***
	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.022)
	[0.050]	[0.002]	[0.017]	[0.014]
Powerless at 0–14	0.039***	−0.048*	−0.034**	−0.027
	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.016)
	[0.000]	[0.102]	[0.029]	[0.114]
Mean of outcome	0.709	1.498	1.890	1.479
Observations	197,581	72,110	200,953	221,777

Notes: OLS estimates of equation (1) with the four life stages entered jointly and the additional controls indicated in each row; Panels A and B as in Table 2, and Panel C splits exposure at every stage into discrimination and powerlessness without discrimination, entered jointly. Outcomes on their original scales (range in the column heading): identity from 0 (only or more national) to 2 (only or more ethnic); trust from 0 (not at all) to 3 (a lot). Coefficients in scale points. Ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects; female indicator; within-country survey weights. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses; wild cluster restricted bootstrap p-values in brackets (Rademacher weights at the EPR-group level, 9,999 replications); *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.




Figure A3: Leave one country out. Average marginal effect of exclusion at ages 0–14 (life stages entered jointly) re-estimated dropping one country at a time; the solid line is the full-sample estimate and the shaded band its 95% confidence interval. Ordered probit, equation (1); within-country survey weights. Bars: 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level.




Figure A4: Leave one ethnic group out. Average marginal effect of exclusion at ages 0–14 (life stages entered jointly) on the probability of the top category, re-estimated dropping one ethnic group (country×Murdock (1959) group) at a time, and ordered from the highest to the lowest estimate. Filled markers: the dropped group was excluded at some point in respondents' lives; hollow markers: never excluded. The nine groups at each end are labeled. The horizontal line is the full-sample estimate; its 95% confidence interval, based on standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level, is reported in the legend. Ordered probit, equation (1); within-country survey weights.

Table A9: Sources of identifying variation: exclusion episodes

Lineage type (lineages)	Share of residual variation (%)		Childhood effect, by type		Childhood effect, without this type	
	Identity (1)	Trust (2)	Identity (3)	Trust (4)	Identity (5)	Trust (6)
Began after entry (28)	58	61	1.3^{***}	-2.0^{***}	1.0^{**}	-0.7
			(0.3)	(0.7)	(0.4)	(0.9)
From entry, ended (37)	23	20	1.4^{***}	-1.8	1.2^{***}	-1.8^{***}
			(0.4)	(1.2)	(0.3)	(0.7)
From entry, ongoing (9)	3	2	-0.4	3.4	1.2^{***}	-2.1^{***}
			(2.6)	(2.9)	(0.2)	(0.6)
Never excluded	16	17				
Largest lineage (% of variation)	5.6	6.3				
Dropping one lineage: range			1.1 to 1.3	-1.6 to -2.2		
Full sample			1.2	-1.9		

Notes: EPR lineages (number in parentheses) are classified by their first exclusion spell, the years in which the lineage is discriminated or powerless: spells that began after the lineage's first year in EPR, typically independence; spells that began in that first year and later ended; and spells that began in that year and are ongoing in 2025. Columns 1–2: share of the weighted residual variation in exclusion at ages 0–14, after partialling out the fixed effects of equation (1), in the identification and trust samples. Columns 3–4: average marginal effect of exclusion at ages 0–14 on the probability of the top category, from one ordered probit with the four life-stage indicators interacted with the three lineage types. Columns 5–6: the same effect in the baseline model, dropping all lineages of that type. Bottom rows: the largest share of residual variation held by one lineage, and the range of the childhood effect when one lineage is dropped at a time (exact re-estimates for the most influential lineages, one-step approximations otherwise). Ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects; female indicator; within-country survey weights. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.4 Alternative Explanations

Table A10: Exclusion, perceived discrimination, education, and economic well-being

	Excluded at age				Ever	At 0–14		Mean	*N*
	0–14	15–25	26–35	36+	excluded	Discr.	Powerl.		
A. Perceived unfair treatment of own group									
Own group treated unfairly often/always	−0.2	−0.8*	−0.2	1.4**	0.2	−0.7	0.3	0.17	184,552
	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(1.1)	(0.5)		
B. Education									
Primary completed or more	1.0*	−0.1	−0.5	−0.8	0.9	1.3	1.0	0.65	222,485
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(0.7)		
Secondary completed or more	0.5	−0.3	−1.6**	1.2	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.30	220,817
	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.8)		
Post-secondary	1.9***	−0.3	−0.6	1.5**	1.7*	1.4*	2.2***	0.14	214,925
	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.7)		
C. Employment									
Has a cash-income job	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.4	1.1	2.5**	−0.3	0.33	222,621
	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(0.8)		
Unemployed (jobless, looking)	−2.1**	−0.1	−0.4	−0.8	−2.3	−1.8	−2.2**	0.47	140,420
	(0.9)	(0.9)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.6)	(1.4)	(1.0)		
D. Economic well-being									
Own living conditions: very good	−0.0	−0.2	−0.2	−0.1	−0.1	−0.6**	0.3	0.05	224,631
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)		
Living conditions vs others: much better	0.1	0.1	0.0	−0.1	0.1	−0.0	0.2	0.03	138,396
	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)		
Lived Poverty Index ≥ 3	0.0	−0.4**	−0.2	−0.2	0.1	0.0	−0.0	0.06	222,938
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)		
Gone without food: always	−0.1	−0.3***	−0.2	0.1	−0.3***	0.1	−0.2	0.04	224,826
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)		
Gone without water: always	−0.1	−0.2	−0.2	−0.3	−0.0	−0.4	−0.1	0.09	224,924
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.2)		
Gone without medical care: always	0.1	−0.2	−0.3*	−0.0	0.4*	0.1	0.1	0.06	224,372
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)		
Gone without cooking fuel: always	0.2*	−0.2*	0.2	−0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2*	0.04	224,368
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)		
Gone without cash income: always	−0.4	−0.5*	−0.3	−0.6	−0.2	−0.5	−0.5	0.17	224,563
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.4)		

Notes: Average marginal effects (percentage points) on the probability of the outcome in each row, from probit (binary outcomes: panels A–C) or ordered probit (panel D; effect on the top category indicated) estimates of equation (1): ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects; female indicator; within-country survey weights. Columns 1–4: life stages entered jointly; column 5: separate model with an indicator for exclusion at any age; columns 6–7: childhood exposure to discrimination and to powerlessness without discrimination, from a model entering the eight stage-by-type indicators jointly. Unfair treatment: "How often are [ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?" (R3–R10). Unemployed: without a cash-income job and looking for one, among those with a job or looking. Living conditions relative to others: R2–R7. Lived Poverty Index: mean of the five "gone without" items (0–4 scale), in four bands. Mean: weighted mean of the outcome (share in the top category for ordered outcomes). Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.5 Heterogeneity

Table A11: Heterogeneity of the effect of ever being excluded: individual characteristics

	Ethnic over national identity		Trust in other ethnic groups	
A. Interaction models: coefficient on Ever excluded × characteristic (latent index)				
Ever excluded × Female	−0.032		−0.025	
	(0.025)		(0.035)	
	[0.218]		[0.483]	
Ever excluded × Secondary schooling	−0.005		0.017	
	(0.029)		(0.032)	
	[0.872]		[0.589]	
Ever excluded × Rural residence	0.023		−0.022	
	(0.028)		(0.036)	
	[0.420]		[0.532]	
B. Split samples: average marginal effect of Ever excluded (pp)				
	$= 0$	$= 1$	$= 0$	$= 1$
Female	1.0*	1.1	−3.0*	−3.2***
	(0.6)	(0.7)	(1.6)	(0.9)
Observations	97,981	97,574	35,868	35,690
Secondary schooling	1.4***	1.1**	−4.5***	−1.1
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(1.4)	(1.1)
Observations	95,821	99,159	33,378	37,999
Rural residence	0.1	1.6***	−3.0***	−2.5*
	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.9)	(1.4)
Observations	81,657	113,892	31,167	40,326

Notes: Ordered probit estimates of equation (1) with an indicator for exclusion at any age: ethnic group×round, country×birth-year, and single-year age fixed effects; female indicator; within-country survey weights. Panel A: coefficient on the interaction between ever excluded and the characteristic in each row (the model also includes the characteristic), standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level in parentheses and wild cluster bootstrap p-values in brackets (9,999 replications). Panel B: average marginal effects (percentage points) of ever excluded on the probability of the top category, estimated separately in each subsample. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A12: Heterogeneity of the effect of ever being excluded: local ethnic diversity and excluded neighbors

	Ethnic over national identity	Trust in other ethnic groups
A. Interaction models: coefficient on Ever excluded × characteristic (latent index)		
Ever excluded × Regional fract. (std.)	−0.033*	0.053**
	(0.018)	(0.025)
	[0.068]	[0.035]
Ever excluded × District fract. (std.)	0.008	0.056**
	(0.016)	(0.024)
	[0.601]	[0.018]
Ever excluded × Excluded neighbors, own group (std.)[a]	0.003	−0.009
	(0.041)	(0.080)
	[0.937]	[0.918]
Ever excluded × Excluded neighbors, other groups (std.)[a]	0.045**	0.091***
	(0.019)	(0.030)
	[0.016]	[0.001]

B. Split samples (below vs. above the median): average marginal effect of Ever excluded (pp)

	Low	High	Low	High
Regional fractionalization	1.8***	1.2*	−4.1***	−0.6
	(0.5)	(0.6)	(1.3)	(1.1)
Observations	94,920	95,155	33,354	33,442
District fractionalization	0.7	1.3	−3.3	−2.1
	(0.8)	(0.8)	(2.2)	(1.3)
Observations	56,146	56,479	21,716	21,797
Country fractionalization	1.1***	1.1**	−4.6***	−1.2
	(0.4)	(0.5)	(1.3)	(1.5)
Observations	97,529	98,507	34,169	35,552
Excluded neighbors, own group[b]	3.1***	2.0**	−7.3**	−5.4***
	(1.0)	(0.8)	(3.2)	(2.0)
Observations	54,341	55,161	21,961	22,332
Excluded neighbors, other groups[b]	−0.8	2.3***	−3.8	−3.2***
	(0.7)	(0.7)	(2.8)	(1.2)
Observations	54,222	55,334	21,963	22,286

Notes: Specification as in Table A11. Regional fractionalization: $1 - \sum_k s_k^2$, where s_k is the share of ethnic group k among all Afrobarometer respondents in the region and round (R3–R10; cells with fewer than 30 answers set to missing). District fractionalization: same measure for the Afrobarometer's first sub-regional location level (R5–R7, R9, R10), multiplied by $n/(n-1)$ to correct for small district samples (cells with fewer than 10 answers set to missing); for trust in other groups it covers R9 and R10 only. Country fractionalization is computed analogously at the country-round level. Low and high: below and above the respondent-level median. [a] Leave-one-out shares of linked respondents in the same district and round (R5–R7, R9, R10; districts with at least 10 linked respondents) whose group was ever excluded during their lifetime, split into those from the respondent's own EPR group and from other groups; both interactions are entered jointly. [b] Split at the median of each share. Close to half of respondents have a share of zero, so for excluded neighbors from other groups the split effectively separates respondents with no such neighbors from those with some. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.




Figure A5: Exclusion and local ethnic diversity. Average marginal effects of exclusion at each life stage (entered jointly) and of ever being excluded (separate model), estimated separately for respondents in regions with below-median (circles) and above-median (squares) ethnic fractionalization, measured from all Afrobarometer respondents in the region and survey round. Ordered probit, equation (1); within-country survey weights. Thin bars: 95% confidence intervals; thick bars: 90%; filled markers: $p < 0.05$. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level.




Figure A6: Exclusion and district-level ethnic diversity. Average marginal effects of exclusion at each life stage (entered jointly) and of ever being excluded (separate model), estimated separately for respondents in districts (the Afrobarometer's first sub-regional location level) with below-median (circles) and above-median (squares) ethnic fractionalization, measured from all Afrobarometer respondents in the district and survey round and corrected for small samples. Ethnic identification: R5–R7, R9, R10; trust in other ethnic groups: R9, R10. Ordered probit, equation (1); within-country survey weights. Thin bars: 95% confidence intervals; thick bars: 90%; filled markers: $p < 0.05$. Standard errors clustered at the EPR-group level.

B Ethnic Groups Exposed to Exclusion

Table B1 lists the 127 ethnic groups in 25 countries with at least one respondent whose group was excluded at some point in her life, together with the EPR groups and spells that define exposure.

Table B1: Ethnic groups exposed to exclusion in the analysis sample

Country	Group	Resp.	Exposed at 0–14	Discriminated EPR group(s), years	Powerless EPR group(s), years
Algeria	Kabyle	127	117	–	Berbers (1962–2025)
	Shawia	107	97	–	Berbers (1962–2025)
	Mzab	22	21	–	Berbers (1962–2025)
Benin	Fon	5,315	2,503	–	South/Central (Fon) (1996–2006)
	Bargu	1,424	254	–	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma) (1964–1967)
	Yoruba (Ben)	1,235	241	–	Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun) (1968–1969)
	Somba	715	97	–	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma) (1964–1967)
	Dendi	467	69	–	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma) (1964–1967)
	Gun	79	24	–	Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun) (1968–1969)
	Gurma	19	3	–	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma) (1964–1967)
Botswana	Tlokwa	820	723	–	Birwa (1966–2025)
	Kgalagadi	715	627	–	Kgalagadi (1966–2025)
	Nusan	250	221	–	San (1966–2025)
	Koba	238	217	–	Yeyi (1966–2025)
	Mbukushu	226	210	–	Mbukushu (1966–2025)
	Hiechware	12	9	–	San (1966–2025)
Burundi	Rundi	1,192	1,106	Hutu (1966–1988)	Hutu (1994–2001)
Côte d'Ivoire	Northerners	2,601	1,608	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) (1994–2002)	–
	Kru (Civ)	1,070	1,056	–	Kru (1960–1999, 2012–2025)
	Southern Mande	507	288	Southern Mande (1994–1999)	–
	Diula	24	16	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) (1994–2002)	–
	Senufo	21	12	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) (1994–2002)	–
	Ngere	12	12	–	Kru (1960–1999, 2012–2025)
	Bete	11	10	–	Kru (1960–1999, 2012–2025)
	Dan	9	5	Southern Mande (1994–1999)	–
	Dida	8	7	–	Kru (1960–1999, 2012–2025)
	Malinke	7	4	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) (1994–2002)	–
	Guro	6	4	Southern Mande (1994–1999)	–
	Bambara	6	2	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) (1994–2002)	–
	Kulango	3	3	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) (1994–2002)	–
	Wobe	1	1	–	Kru (1960–1999, 2012–2025)
Gabon	Mpongwe	390	243	–	Myene (1960–1967); Orungu (2001–2005)
	Lumbo	1,258	141	–	Eshira/Bapounou (1963–1967)
Ghana	Ewe	2,439	505	–	Ewe (1970–1971)
Guinea	Foutadjalon	2,381	1,416	–	Peul (1986–2008, 2011–2025)
	Malinke	2,217	1,460	–	Malinke (1986–2008)
	Koranko	8	7	–	Malinke (1986–2008)
	Dialonke	7	3	–	Malinke (1986–2008)
Kenya	Kikuyu	3,412	2,648	Kikuyu-Meru-Emb (1979–2002)	–
	Luo	2,097	1,916	Luo (1967–2002, 2006–2007)	Luo (2018–2025)

Table B1 continued

Country	Group	Resp.	Exposed at 0–14	Discriminated EPR group(s), years	Powerless EPR group(s), years
	Kamba	1,949	1,546	Kikuyu-Meru-Emb (1979–2002)	Kamba (2018–2025)
	Gusii	1,177	334	–	Kisii (2003–2007)
	Wanga	2,671	25	–	Luhya (2018–2025)
	Meru	1,119	884	Kikuyu-Meru-Emb (1979–2002)	–
	Somali (Ken)	292	274	Somali (1963–2002, 2012–2025)	–
	Gyriama	56	25	–	Mijikenda (1963–1978)
	Digo	11	8	–	Mijikenda (1963–1978)
	Duruma	9	6	–	Mijikenda (1963–1978)
Liberia	Kpelle	1,759	704	Indigenous Peoples (1946–1980)	–
	Gio	636	407	Gio (1981–1989); Indigenous Peoples (1946–1980)	–
	Mano	611	404	Indigenous Peoples (1946–1980); Mano (1981–1989)	–
	Kran	368	345	Indigenous Peoples (1946–1980); Krahn (Guere) (1997–2003)	Krahn (Guere) (2019–2025)
	Grebo (Lbr)	772	334	Indigenous Peoples (1946–1980)	–
	Kru	539	212	Indigenous Peoples (1946–1980)	–
	Kissi (Lbr)	360	136	Indigenous Peoples (1946–1980)	–
Madagascar	Merina	2,505	990	–	Highlanders (1960–1972)
	Betsileo	1,283	474	–	Highlanders (1960–1972)
	Sihanaka	251	85	–	Highlanders (1960–1972)
	Tanala	204	78	–	Highlanders (1960–1972)
Malawi	Chewa	4,741	3,864	–	Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao) (1964–1994)
	Lomwe	2,015	1,596	–	Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao) (1964–1994)
	Yao	1,665	1,392	–	Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao) (1964–1994)
	Tumbuka	1,247	1,032	–	Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde) (1964–1994)
	Nyanja	739	594	–	Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao) (1964–1994)
	Nyakyusa	138	103	–	Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde) (1964–1994)
Mali	Aulliminden	245	174	–	Tuareg (1960–1991)
Morocco	Rif	107	106	–	Berbers (1956–2025)
Mozambique	Ndau	784	674	–	Shona-Ndau (1975–2025)
	Tawara	89	74	–	Shona-Ndau (1975–2025)
	Manyika	14	12	–	Shona-Ndau (1975–2025)
Namibia	Herero	987	646	–	Himba (1990–2025)
	Bergdama	850	570	–	San (1990–2025)
	Nama	501	340	–	San (1990–2025)
	Subia	135	100	–	Mafwe (1990–2025)
Niger	Hausa	3,272	3,187	–	Hausa (1960–1991, 1997–1999, 2011)
	Aulliminden	510	500	Tuareg (1991–1993)	Tuareg (1960–1990, 1997–1999, 2005–2011)
	Sokoto	123	122	–	Hausa (1960–1991, 1997–1999, 2011)
	Teda	21	21	–	Toubou (1960–1999, 2010–2011, 2017–2025)
Nigeria	Yoruba	3,799	3,481	–	Yoruba (1960–1966, 1979–1998)
	Ibo	3,096	2,755	Igbo (1967)	Igbo (1965–1966, 1984–1998)
	Ijaw	479	479	Ijaw (1992–2007)	Ijaw (1960–1970, 1979–1991, 2016–2025)
	Tiv	344	340	–	Tiv (1960–1970, 1979–2025)
	Egba	4	4	–	Yoruba (1960–1966, 1979–1998)
Sierra Leone	Mende	2,433	1,954	–	Mende (1968–1992, 2013–2015)
	Temne	2,080	1,062	–	Northern Groups (Temne, Limba) (1965–1967, 2002–2005)

Table B1 continued

Country	Group	Resp.	Exposed at 0–14	Discriminated EPR group(s), years	Powerless EPR group(s), years
	Limba	561	280	–	Northern Groups (Temne, Limba) (1965–1967, 2002–2005)
	Kono	410	404	–	Kono (1961–1992, 1997, 2002–2005, 2016–2018)
South Africa	Zulu	3,427	3,045	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
	Xosa	2,798	2,529	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
	Sotho	1,356	1,211	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
	Pedi	1,211	1,045	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
	Tswana (Zaf)	871	689	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
	Thonga	687	608	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
	Swazi	497	459	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
	Venda	372	315	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
	Laka (Ndebele)	262	229	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
	Kgatla	24	24	Blacks (1946–1989)	Blacks (1990–1994)
Tanzania	Pemba	2,856	2,616	–	Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans) (1965–2025)
	Masai	275	182	–	Maasai (1992–2025)
Togo	Ewe	2,211	2,095	–	Ewe (and related groups) (1967–1990, 1992–2005, 2016–2025)
	Adja-Ouatchi (Tgo)	601	578	–	Ewe (and related groups) (1967–1990, 1992–2005, 2016–2025)
	Kabre	1,108	74	–	Kabré (and related groups) (1960–1962)
Uganda	Ganda	3,735	2,396	Baganda (1967–1971, 1975–1986)	Baganda (1972–1974)
	Nkole	2,328	1,509	South-Westeners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) (1975–1986)	South-Westeners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) (1967–1974)
	Soga	2,130	1,343	Basoga (1975–1986)	Basoga (1967–1974)
	Teso	1,072	1,011	Teso (1967–1974, 1987–2005)	Teso (1975–1979, 2006–2025)
	Lango	1,001	917	Langi/Acholi (1972–1979, 1987–2005)	Langi/Acholi (2006–2025)
	Acholi	676	624	Langi/Acholi (1972–1979, 1987–2005)	Langi/Acholi (2006–2025)
	Lugbara	808	460	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur) (1980–1986)	Far North-West Nilers (Madi, Lugbara, Alur) (1975–1979)
	Nyoro	744	461	South-Westeners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) (1975–1986)	South-Westeners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) (1967–1974)
	Alur	554	319	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur) (1980–1986)	Far North-West Nilers (Madi, Lugbara, Alur) (1975–1979)
	Madi	288	167	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur) (1980–1986)	Far North-West Nilers (Madi, Lugbara, Alur) (1975–1979)
	Karamojong	308	158	Karamojong (1972–1986)	–
	Toro	93	85	South-Westeners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) (1975–1986)	South-Westeners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) (1967–1974)
	Fajulu	82	53	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur) (1980–1986)	–
	Jonam (Uga)	6	5	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur) (1980–1986)	Far North-West Nilers (Madi, Lugbara, Alur) (1975–1979)
Zambia	Tonga	1,442	29	–	Tonga-Ila-Lenje (Southerners) (2017–2025)
	Lenje	219	3	–	Tonga-Ila-Lenje (Southerners) (2017–2025)
	Ila	89	4	–	Tonga-Ila-Lenje (Southerners) (2017–2025)
	Subia	45	1	–	Tonga-Ila-Lenje (Southerners) (2017–2025)

Table B1 continued

Country	Group	Resp.	Exposed at 0–14	Discriminated EPR group(s), years	Powerless EPR group(s), years
Zimbabwe	Zezuru	6,768	2,902	Africans (1965–1979)	–
	Ndebele	1,524	1,370	Africans (1965–1979); Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga) (1982–1987, 2000–2008)	–
	Karanga	1,324	1,184	Africans (1965–1979); Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga) (1982–1987, 2000–2008)	–
	Korekore	843	365	Africans (1965–1979)	–
	Ndau	474	348	Africans (1965–1979); Ndau (Shona sub-group) (1982–1991)	–
	Tonga	249	228	Africans (1965–1979); Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga) (1982–1987, 2000–2008)	–
	Manyika	32	24	Africans (1965–1979); Manyika (Shona sub-group) (1988–1991)	–

Notes: Ethnic groups in the analysis sample (respondents with at least one of the main outcomes, Afrobarometer rounds 2–10) with at least one respondent exposed to exclusion at some point in life. *Group* is the ethnic group used in the linkage (mostly Murdock, 1959 names); *Resp.* is the number of respondents and *Exposed at 0–14* the number whose group was excluded while they were aged 0–14. The last two columns list every EPR group in the respondent's lineage (linked groups and their EPR predecessors) with DISCRIMINATED or POWERLESS status and the years of each spell (EPR Core 2021; 2021 statuses carried forward to 2025). Spells after the interview do not enter the treatment, and respondents interviewed during an ongoing discrimination spell are excluded.