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Academic Papers Artículo en revista académica

Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions

  • person Tibor Heumann

    Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris; Constantine Sorokin; Eyal Winter

  • class American Economic Review: Insights, Vol. 4, Issue 3, Pag. 371-388

Abstract: We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second-price auction. The seller faces a trade-off: more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but creates higher information rents for bidders. The information disclosure policy that maximizes the revenue of the seller is to fully reveal low values (where competition is high) but to pool high values (where competition is low). The size of the pool is determined by a critical quantile that is independent of the distribution of values and only dependent on the number of bidders. We discuss how this policy provides a rationale for conflation in digital advertising.