Abstract: According to the compensating wage differentials theory, employees have to be paid for job riskiness. If the worker has a public insurance for labor accidents, compensation will be less. The objective of this document is to study the labor riskiness compensations obtained in Chile considering different occupations and adscription to the public insurance. A conceptual framework is proposed to understand the risk premium structure and estimate the risk incidence in the wage to calculate compensating differentials. The risk is measured using two fatal risk indicators and a unique no fatal indicator. The results showed that non-insured workers demand a
higher wage in risky occupations, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, for insured workers, only an approach to riskiness compensation is reached because of the existence of biases which make difficult a more detailed identification of its composition. When comparing both groups, insured employees obtained a lesser wage compared to non-insured employees for fatal riskier occupations, ceteris paribus. Finally, considering the nonfatal risk indicator, there is selection bias and after correcting it the variable is no longer significant.