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Publicado en: Artículo en revista académica

On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games

Tibor Heumann.

Journal of Mathematical Economics, October 2020. Vol. 90. Pages 109-118

Abstract: We study sender-receiver games in which a privately informed sender sends a message to N receivers, who then take an action. The sender’s type space T has finite cardinality (i.e., |T|<∞). We show that every equilibrium payoff vector (resp. every Pareto efficient equilibrium payoff vector) is achieved by an equilibrium in which the sender sends at most |T|+N (resp. |T|+N−1) messages with positive probability. We also show that such bounds do not exist when two privately informed senders simultaneously send a message to a receiver.

Keywords: Sender-receiver games, Asymmetric information, Mechanism design with limited commitment


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