Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions
Nicolás Figueroa; Gonzalo Cisternas.
The RAND Journal of Economics Volume 46, Issue 4, pages 824–843, Winter 2015
We characterize the optimal mechanism and investment level in an environment where (i) two projects are purchased sequentially, (ii) the buyer can commit to a two-period mechanism, and (iii) the winner of the first project can invest in a costreducing technology between auctions. We show that, in an attempt to induce more competition in the first period, the optimal mechanism gives an advantage to the first-period winner in the second auction. As a result of this advantage, the first-period winner invests more than the socially efficient level. Optimal advantages therefore create two channels for cost minimization in buyer-supplier relationships.
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Etiquetas: diseño de mecanismos, mecanismos secuenciales