Paper: Perfectly Achievable Matching: the One-to-One Case
Abstract: We say that a matching is perfectly achievable if it is perfect with respect to the sets of achievable partners, namely if every agent is matched to an achievable partner. (An agent is achievable to another if they are matched in some stable matching.) We show that perfectly achievable matchings have the following properties: (i) they are Pareto efficient; (ii) all women (men) weakly prefer the woman-optimal (man-optimal) stable matching to any perfectly achievable matching; (iii) for any two distinct perfectly achievable matchings, there exist two pairs, each formed under one of the two matchings, such that the agents in each pair have opposite preferences over the two matchings; (iv) if agents are asked to vote between a stable matching and a perfectly achievable matching, the two matchings tie; and (v) truthtelling is a rationalizable strategy for perfectly achievable mechanisms.
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Teoría Económica
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