1. Iniciokeyboard_arrow_right
  2. Seminarioskeyboard_arrow_right
  3. Martin Peitz, Mannheim University
Organización Industrial

Martin Peitz, Mannheim University


Paper: The Two Sides of Platform Ad Load

Abstract: Heavier advertising need not generate more ad exposure: a higher ad load shortens the time consumers spend on a platform. Because ad exposure is the product of ad load and time on-board, it is hump-shaped in the load. Combined with advertiser demand, this creates a sharp regime distinction. An advertising-financed platform is consumer-facing when the exposure peak binds and advertiser-facing when its revenue-maximizing exposure is attainable. In the advertiser-facing regime, this exposure is attainable at a low or a high ad load; endogenous consumer participation selects the lower load. The equilibrium ad load rises with ad nuisance in the advertiser-facing regime but falls once the exposure peak binds. Advertising is always excessive in the consumer-facing regime but may be insufficient in the advertiser-facing regime. A tax or subsidy on exposure can implement the social optimum, whereas a cap on time spent on the platform may induce a higher ad load.

19 de Noviembre de 2026

00:10 a 01:10


location_on Lugar

local_play Categoria

Organización Industrial

CONTACTO DEL EVENTO


email Correo

seminarios@facea.uc.cl